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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance and the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure. 
The capital structure determinants are also examined. The empirical investigation of this 
thesis is focused on 215 companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) period 
from 2005 to 2009. This sample of firms excludes financial firms, insurance companies, 
investment companies, leasing and utilities firms. To examine the above relationships, 
we employ the panel data methodology running a set of multivariate regressions. 
Overall, the results support the importance of board governance variables to influence 
firm value and capital structure of the Greek listed firms. Moreover, we find evidence 
that the capital structure determinants exert influence on the leverage of the Greek listed 
firms.  
Keywords: Corporate governance mechanisms, capital structure determinants, firm 
performance, Athens Stock Exchange  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Our economic life has been inflicted by the “economic imperialism”, where 
economic factors and the money flow influence almost all aspects of our society, 
including enterprises. This new corporate era makes the viability of companies more 
difficult and enhances the danger of bankruptcy. It is evident that effective and 
organised regulatory policies should take place. There is an ongoing debate what is the 
company’s response to new threats. Some academics and practitioners alike consider 
corporate governance as the appropriate recipe to new corporate challenges.  
Corporate governance is a system of structuring, operating and controlling a 
company with a view to achieve long term strategic goals to satisfy shareholders, 
creditors, employees, customers and suppliers, and comply with the legal and regulatory 
requirements, apart from meeting environmental and local community needs. The 
economic performance and development of a company is strongly affected by its 
corporate governance. The positive effect of good corporate governance is a tool for 
socio-economic development. On the other hand, bad corporate governance can lead to 
poor operational performance or even worse to corporate bankruptcy. Consequently, 
many researchers have been trying to solve the problem of
 
conflict of interests between 
equity owners and managers.  
Many researchers came up with different definitions upon the term of corporate 
governance. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that corporate governance 
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment. Also, Monks and Minow (1995) stated that 
corporate governance is the relationship among various participants such as chief 
executive officer, management, shareholders and employees in determining the 
direction and performance of corporations. Furthermore, Magdi and Nadareh (2002) 
argued that corporate governance is ensuring that the businesses operate properly and 
investors receive a fair return.
 
Another definition about corporate governance is that of 
Mathiesen and Henrik (2002) who argued that corporate governance is an economic 
field that investigates how to secure and/or motivate efficient management of 
corporations by the use of incentive mechanisms, such as contracts, organizational 
designs and legislation. 
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Since 2001 there has been a renewed interest in the corporate governance 
practices due to collapses of high profile companies such as Enron Corporation, Arthur 
Andersen and WorldCom. Under the pressure of companies collapse, governments have 
designed policies of resolving problems related with the protection of the interests of 
shareholders and creditors.
 
For instance, in 2002, the US federal government passed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, intending to restore public confidence in corporate governance.
 
 
 In the light of the dramatic decrease of the market capitalization of the Athens 
Stock Market in mid-1999, the instances of stock price manipulation and other 
fraudulent practices, the Greek government attempted to re-establish investors’ 
confidence. The response of the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission was prompt. It 
set up a Committee on Corporate Governance, which initiated discussions among 
market participants, auditors, legal practitioners and investors. These discussions 
eventually led to the publication of a voluntary Code of Conduct, entitled Principles of 
Corporate Governance (Committee on Corporate Governance, 1999). This code 
includes some of the recommendations of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (OECD, 1999). OECD Principles was made in order to achieve the highest 
sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in 
member countries, to contribute to economic expansion and finally to contribute to the 
expansion of world trade. Three years later, the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
issued the law (3016/2002), which for the first time obliges the Greek listed companies 
to adopt a set of governance rules. This law (known as the corporate governance law) 
effectively mandates compliance with a subset of principles contained in the code.  The 
law contains detailed instructions about the form of a firm’s corporate governance and 
specifically, the amount of independent serving on the board, the firms internal 
organization, the audit committees and the participation of shareholders in the decision 
making process. More specifically, the law designates that the number of non executive 
directors should not be less than the 1/3 of the total number of directors who are in the 
board. According to the law, non executive and independent directors are defined as the 
board members who do not posses any stockholding and are not in the payroll of the 
firm. It should be mentioned that the corporate governance law do not provide any 
limitation for the positions of the CEO and the chairman of the board. Therefore, the 
same person can be CEO and chairman of the board or otherwise. 
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 Besides firm performance, corporate governance policies can affect the capital 
structure of a company. The above statement is also confirmed by Friend and Lang 
(1988) as well as Berger et al. (1997). According to Glen and Pinto (1994) a very 
important decision that firms face is the decision of how to handle their capital 
structure. The capital structure or financial structure of a firm is a specific mixture of 
debt and equity, which the firm uses to finance its operations. Decisions related to 
capital structure are crucial for any business organization.
 
Good corporate governance 
practices may have significant influence on the strategic decisions of a company, for 
example external financing, that are taken at board level. Therefore, corporate 
governance variables such as board size, board composition, and CEO duality may have 
direct impact on capital structure decisions. As already mentioned, the relationship 
between corporate governance and capital structure is really significant although it has 
not been fully explored. Friend and Lang (1988); Berger et al. (1997); Wen et al. 
(2002); Abor (2007); Hasan and Butt (2009) and more recently Saad (2010) are among 
the authors who examined the influence of corporate governance practices on capital 
structure decisions of firms for both developed and emerging markets.  
Another issue that can affect the financial leverage of a firm is various capital 
structure determinants. First, Modigliani and Miller (1958) argued that the total value of 
the business is not affected by the decision of managers to alter the capital structure of 
the company. In conclusion, it does not matter which dividend policy the firm follows, 
but it depends on what is commonly known as the investment policy of the company. 
Brealey and Myers (2000) denoted capital structure as the firm’s mix of different 
securities, while Emery and Finnerty (1997) supported that capital structure is how a 
firm finances itself.  
It is known that decisions concerning capital structures are very important for 
the future of each company. Many managers are continuously trying to find how to take 
wise decisions about capital structure because the decisions are crucial for the welfare 
of the firm. The managers of the corporations aim to find the perfect combination of 
debt and equity which maximizes the wealth of the firm and minimizes the cost of 
capital. Financial distress and/or bankruptcy may be caused by a false financing 
decision. 
The capital structure determinants of the Greek listed firms have not been 
extensively examined in the past i.e. Voulgarakis et al. (2002) Daskalakis and Psillaki, 
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(2008). Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) in their research found similarities in the factors 
that affect capital structure of SMEs of Greek and French firms. Capital structure is one 
of the most researched topics in the field of corporate finance and led to the form of 
different theories like pecking order theory, trade-off theory and agency cost theory. 
However, the appropriate and acceptable level of financial leverage is still debatable by 
the top management of a firm and it is still under investigation.  
The objective of this dissertation is three-fold. First, it aims to examine the 
relationship between various corporate governance mechanisms and other control 
variables with firm performance. Profitability ratios, board governance variables and a 
variety of other variables are used to examine the influence of corporate governance on 
the performance of Greek listed firms. 
The second objective of this thesis is to investigate whether corporate 
governance affects the capital structure of a company using data from the Greek capital 
market. Profitability ratio, board governance variables and firm size variable are used to 
examine the influence of corporate governance on the financial leverage of Greek listed 
firms.  
The last objective of this study is to analyze the capital structure determinants of 
the Greek listed firms. Particularly, it is examined whether there is any correlation 
between profitability, size, tangibility and growth with leverage. It should be referred 
that the examined period spans from 2005 to 2009. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no similar study that examines all the 
above relationships employing data from the Athens Stock Exchange. The motivation 
for examining all the above relationships is the scarcity of relevant research in the Greek 
financial literature. Moreover, during the examined period the Greek capital market had 
undergone a significant downturn. This is another reason to consider and critically 
examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure. It is 
believed that the empirical results will be useful to scholars, businessmen, stock 
exchange authorities, managers and practitioners alike. 
The rest of this dissertation is divided in four parts: The second section presents 
the literature review. Previous researches on this topic are assessed. The third section, 
the methods employed in this thesis are presented. In the fourth section the empirical 
results are presented. Finally, the fifth section contains the concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 2.1 Literature Review     
The literature review of the current study is divided in three parts. In the first 
part, scholar’s opinions are examined concerning the way that the corporate governance 
affects firm performance. The second part, investigates how the corporate governance 
affects the firm capital structure. Finally, the third part explores the capital structure 
determinants worldwide.  
In the first part, we present the literature concerning the relationship between 
corporate performance and various corporate governance characteristics, such as board 
size, board composition, CEO duality, audit company, firm size and leverage. The 
pertinent literature showed mixed results. During the last decade many studies tried to 
find if there is a relationship between corporate governance and firm performance of 
listed firms. The literature revealed that corporate governance indeed affects the firm 
performance. In fact, researchers tried to find the appropriate variables that influence 
firm performance. They examined series of independent variables that possibly affect 
the performance of a firm.  
The first independent variable that was examined is the number of directors 
participating in the board of the firm. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) 
showed that as the number of board members increases so losses in productivity and 
efficiency arise due to coordination and process problems. This results in ineffective 
monitoring and control of management by the boards of directors. Empirical evidence 
has shown that the size of the board has a considerable influence on firms’ performance. 
Monks and Minow (1995) proved that the board size affects the extent of monitoring, 
controlling and decision making in a company. Furthermore, Yermack (1996) using 
data from US listed firms showed that there is a significant negative relationship 
between the number of the directors in the board and market performance as measured 
by the Tobin’s Q ratio. On the contrary, Holthausen and Larcker (1993) failed to find an 
association between firm performance and the size of the board.  
It should be referred that the majority of the studies which test the relationship 
between firm performance and corporate governance characteristics have been 
conducted in developing countries like Malaysia and Nigeria. In specific, Hossain et al. 
(2001) showed a negative and significant relationship between board size and market 
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performance as measured by the Tobin’s Q ratio. Similarly, Roszaini and Mohammad 
(2006) investigated the relationship between the corporate governance structure and 
performance of 347 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange in Malaysia 
from 1996 to 2000. They found that board size is negatively correlated with firm’s 
market performance. In contrast, they showed that board size is positively related with 
the accounting performance as measured by the return on assets (ROA). Furthermore, 
Kajola (2008) who made a survey for all the Nigerian listed firms found that the number 
of directors in the board is positively correlated with firm performance as measured by 
the return on equity (ROE).  
Another aspect of the corporate governance mechanism that has been tested by 
many studies is the proportion of outside directors and how they are interrelated with 
firm performance. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Brickley et al. (1994) as well as John 
and Senbet (1998) showed that the proportion of outside directors was found to have a 
significant positive relationship to firm performance. Moreover, Weisback (1988) 
showed that firms having board of directors dominated by outsiders perform more 
effectively than others.  In contrast, Weir and Laing (2001) found a negative 
relationship between the number of outside directors and firm performance. Agrawal 
and Knoeber (1996) reached to similar conclusion.  
On the other hand, Fosberg (1989) and also Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
found no relationship between the proportion of outside directors and various 
performance measures. Similar results have been reported by Yermack (1996) and by 
Bhagat and Black (1998). Moreover, Roszaini and Mohammad (2006) showed that 
boards of the Malaysian listed firms that are dominated by outside directors do not seem 
to affect firm performance regardless of the measures used. Kajola (2008), using data 
from Nigeria proved that the return on equity is positively correlated with the firm’s 
board composition. Furthermore, Ehikioya (2009) showed that there is no link between 
board composition and firm performance in a sample of Nigeria listed firms.  
Several studies have examined whether the separation of the Chief Executive 
Officer and the chairman of the board affects firm performance. Many of them argue 
that if the same person occupies both of the positions, agency problems will arise 
frequently. There is abundant literature testing whether CEO duality affects firm 
performance. Some researchers argue that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance, while others suggest that there is a negative relationship 
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between the two variables. Finally, some others believe that there is no relationship 
between the two variables. Undoubtedly the above relationship merits investigation. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) were the first who suggested the separation of CEO and 
chairperson’s position supporting the idea that corporations perform better that way. 
Yermack (1996) showed that a firm performs better when the CEO and the chairman of 
the board positions are occupied by different persons. Furthermore, Fosberg and Nelson 
(1999) claimed that firms which employ two different persons for the position of the 
chairman and the CEO experience a significant improvement in their performance. 
Dehaene et al. (2001) found evidence that there is a positive relationship between 
duality and firm performance. Roszaini and Mohammad (2006) showed that CEO 
duality is negatively related to accounting performance. This means that the accounting 
performance of the Malaysian listed firms is influenced negatively when there is one 
person for the CEO and chairman position. Kajola, (2008) showed that firms’ separation 
of CEO and chairman of the board is significant and positively correlated with return on 
equity. 
However, Brickley et al. (1997) claimed that there is no systematic link between 
duality status and organizational performance or market value. Similarly, Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) and also Weir and Laing (1999) came to the same conclusion.  
A control variable that is tested whether affects firm performance is leverage.  
Leverage is the amount of debt used to finance a firm’s assets and is considered to be 
one of the most important determinants of capital structure. Most of the Greek listed 
companies are family owned with less exposition to debt. Therefore, it is very 
interesting to examine the relationship between leverage and firm performance. Ahuja 
and Majumdar (1998) made a survey on Indian firms and showed that there is a positive 
relationship between debt level and firm performance. Ahmadu et al. (2005) and also 
Ehikioya (2009) showed that leverage has significantly positive influence on firm 
performance for the Nigerian listed firms. Sulong and Nor (2010) found that the 
leverage of Malaysian listed firms is significantly and positively related to firm value.
 
  
Another control variable that is tested is firm size. Hannan and Freeman (1989) 
reported that smaller firms are more creative, more innovative and ready to change in 
order to enhance their corporate value. In contrast, Ghosh (1998) showed that large 
firms are better performers because they are able to diversify their risk. Roszaini and 
Mohammad (2006) showed that firm size have a statistically significant positive 
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relationship with accounting performance. Moreover, Ahmadu et al. (2005) conducted a 
research for all the Nigeria listed companies and found that there is a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between firm size and two performance measures 
such as return on assets and Tobin’s Q ratio.  On the other hand, Ehikioya (2009) for the 
same country showed that the size of the firm has a positive impact on firm 
performance.  
Another variable that has been tested in research papers is the proportion of the 
capital expenditure. Capital expenditure is the amount invested in fixed assets and it is 
used as a proxy for growth. Lang et al. (1989) and Smith and Watts (1992) found that 
there is a significant relationship between the amount of capital expenditure and 
corporate performance. Roszaini and Mohammad (2006) showed a significant positive 
relationship between market performance and capital expenditure.  
Finally, the reputation of audit companies plays significant role in the auditing 
process and in the reliability of earnings releases. Auditors report whether the accounts 
are true and fair, whether the company faces the danger of bankruptcy, whether the firm 
is managed competently, whether the firm is run in accordance with the law, free of 
fraud, and whether the firm adopts a responsible attitude to environmental and societal 
issues. It is common practice to classify the audit companies into two categories. The 
first category comprises the big audit firms, while the second category encompasses the 
medium and small audit firms. Shafer et al. (2001), using data from Hong Kong, 
employed a dummy variable so as to separate the size and the reputation of the audit 
companies. They defined big four auditors the companies that audit most of the large 
companies and non big four companies that audit medium and small firms.  
The second objective of the current thesis is to test of how corporate governance 
affects the capital structure of a company. Many studies have examined the relation 
between various corporate governance mechanisms and firm leverage. First of all, it is 
examined the relationship between board size and leverage. Pfeffer and Salancick 
(1978) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) showed that there is a significant relationship 
between capital structure and board size.
 
Moreover, Berger et al. (1997) demonstrated 
that corporations which have many members on their board, on general, have low 
gearing levels. Similarly, Abor (2007) found that there is a significantly negative 
relationship between board size and capital structure.  
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In addition, this paper examines how the capital structure of companies is 
affected by the proportion of outside directors. Pfeffer (1973) and Pfeffer and Salancick 
(1978), found evidence that high proportion of outside directors is associated with high 
leverage levels. Moreover, Jensen (1986) and Berger et al. (1997) argue that firms with 
higher leverage rather have relatively more outside directors, while firms with low 
percentage of outside directors experience lower leverage. On the contrary, Wen et al. 
 
(2002) found a significantly negative relationship between the number of outside 
directors on the board and leverage.  
Another corporate governance characteristic affecting capital structure is the 
relationship between CEO duality and capital structure, Fama and Jensen (1983) found 
that CEO duality influences the financing decision of the firm, but the relationship is not 
statistically significant. According to Fosberg (2004), firms with a two-tier leadership 
structure should be more likely to employ the optimal amount of debt in their capital 
structures than firms in which there is duality. Moreover, Abor (2007) in his study 
found that there is a significantly positive relationship between CEO duality and 
leverage implying that larger boards adopt low debt policy.
 
 
The size of the firm is considered to influence not only the performance of a 
corporation, but also the capital structure. First, Marsh (1982) as well as Friend and 
Lang (1988) supported that there is a positive relationship between firm size and 
leverage levels. On the other hand, Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that large firms are 
generally well-established and have good performance. In fact, they reduce their 
reliance on debt and, therefore, a negative relationship exists between size and leverage 
of the firm which shows that large firms can arrange debt financing due to long term 
relationship and better collateral offering. Similarly, Abor (2007) found that there is a 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage. The results suggest that higher 
profits increase the level of internal financing. Therefore, firms that generate more 
internal funds generally tend to avoid debt.  
Another variable that is alleged to affect capital structure is the age of a 
company from its establishment. Chittenden et al. (1996), Jordan et al. (1998), 
Michaelas et al. (1999) and Hall et al. (2004) also tested the effect of company age to 
capital structure. In conclusion, the above scholars found negative correlation between 
the independent variable age of firm and leverage. 
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The third objective of this thesis is devoted to the capital structure determinants. 
The first study that examined the capital structure determinants was that of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958). In their seminal work they found that the value of a firm is 
unaffected by how the firm is financed. The theory of Miller and Modigliani made 
certain assumptions that do not hold in the real economy such as, perfect capital market, 
no taxes, no transaction, bankruptcy and asymmetric information costs. Their theory is 
known as the irrelevance theory.  
Due to the fact that the assumptions made by Modigliani and Miller (1958) do 
not hold in a real economy the authors restated their conclusions in their study which 
named “a correction” (1963) by taking into account the corporate taxes. In this study 
they argued that the firm’s value becomes an increasing function of debt when the 
corporate tax is taken into account. The work of Modigliani and Miller triggered a large 
number of researches who then tried to explain how each company determines the 
amount of borrowing, how the new investments should financed and also which is the 
optimal level of borrowing that maximizes the value of the firm.  
The capital structure irrelevance theory produced the trade-off theory. Extensive 
research has been made for the trade-off models which have dominated the capital 
structure literature. Baxter (1967) argued that a firm should not use more debt than the 
point where the cost of debt becomes larger than the tax advantage. He also mentioned 
that when firms increase their debt they also increase their chance of bankruptcy due to 
the demand of larger risk premium from the investors. Moreover, Miller (1977) 
demonstrated that even in the presence of taxes the irrelevance theory may hold under 
certain conditions. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) made an attempt to extent and 
generalize Miller’s (1977) differential personal tax model by taking into account the 
existence of non-debt shields such as depreciation deductions and investment tax 
credits. They found that each firm has its own optimal capital structure where 
maximizes its value. According to their study, to optimize their capital structure firms 
have to take into account the tax benefits and agency and bankruptcy costs as well and 
try to hold these three in equilibrium.  
On the other hand, the phenomenon of “zero” debt firms lead to an alternative 
theory called “pecking order theory”. The pecking order theory introduced by Myers 
and Majluf (1984) is based on the idea of asymmetric information between managers 
and shareholders. The theory assumes that there is no optimal level of borrowing where 
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the value of the company is maximized. Managers as insiders know more about the 
value and the risk of the firm than shareholders who are outsiders. In order to avoid the 
underinvestment problem, managers try to finance the new projects with internal funds 
and riskless debt. More specifically, internal financing such as the use of retained 
earnings is preferred by the managers. If the above is not considered adequate a new 
dept is issued. The issue of new shares is considered a last resort by the managers. 
Agency cost is an important parameter which should be taken into account when 
determining the capital structure of a firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen 
(1986) argued that apart from the bankruptcy costs there are also the agency costs which 
are created between managers, shareholders and debt holders. According to their study, 
the agency costs are also determinants of the capital structure of a firm. Managers take 
the authority from shareholders to manage the firm and act in the interest of firm’s 
wealth and shareholders benefits. But usually conflicts of interest arise between 
shareholders and managers who may take decisions serving their own interests but 
jeopardize the firm. Therefore, Jensen (1986) research paper suggests that agency costs 
could be reduced by increasing the ownership of managers. So the interests of managers 
and shareholders could be aligned and/or by increasing the use of debt in the firm the 
equity base is reduced and thus the percentage of equity owned by the managers is 
increased.  
With regard to international evidence, many empirical studies have been 
conducted examining the capital structure determinants, but most of them referred to 
developed countries. Titman and Wessels (1988) carried out an empirical study in the 
capital structure determinants of US firms and reported that debt levels are negatively 
related to the “uniqueness” of a firm’s line of business. Rajan and Zingales (1995) used 
data from the G7 countries and tried to analyze the financing decisions of public firms. 
They showed that factors that were correlated with firms’ leverage in US there were 
also correlated in G7 countries. Antoniou et al. (2002) analyzed data from top three 
European countries, United Kingdom, France and Germany. The results of their 
research suggested that the capital structure decisions of firms in all three countries are 
not only affected by firm-specific reasons, but also by market factors in each country. 
Furthermore, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) analyzed the determinants of capital structure 
of UK firms. The results showed that larger companies have higher levels of debt than 
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smaller firms. Furthermore, they showed that profitability is negatively correlated with 
the level of gearing.  
It is evident from the above that the majority of studies concern developed 
countries. There are few studies that provide evidence from developing countries. Booth 
et al. (2001) analyzed data from ten developing countries and they found that capital 
structure choices are affected by the same variables as in developed countries. Jean 
Chen (2004) tried to explore the capital structure determinants of the Chinese public-
listed companies for the period 1995-2000. The results from the research indicated that 
certain firm-specific factors explaining capital structure in developed countries are also 
relevant for explaining the capital structure of Chinese listed companies. Attaulah and 
Safiullah (2007) examined the capital structure determinants of Karachi Stock Exchange 
listed firms excluding the non-financial firms for a period of 8 years. They proved that 
the trade off theory is held in the case of tangibility. In contrast, the earning volatility 
and depreciation variables failed to confirm the trade-off theory.  
Regarding the Greek capital market, there are few studies that explore the capital 
structure determinants. Voulgarakis et al. (2002) collected data from 75 large 
manufacturing Greek firms and showed that, profitability of sales, productivity of total 
assets, firm size and assets growth are the main capital structure determinants. All 
gearing ratios displayed significant scale effects. They also argued that the negative 
association of net profit margins and total debt induce higher use of debt in the large 
scale enterprise (LSEs) of the Greek manufacturing sector. Finally, they found a 
positive association between gross profit margins and long term debt.   
Another study concerning the Greek capital market is that of Daskalakis and 
Psillaki (2008). In specific, they tried to investigate the capital structure determinants of 
small and medium size enterprises using a sample of French and Greek firms. 
Moreover, they examined whether the capital structure determinants of small or medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) are the same in the two countries and whether the 
determinants that affect the capital structure of firms in both countries are country-
specific or firm-specific. They used the panel data method for a sample of firms for a 
period of four years starting from 1998. They showed that small and medium size firms 
in both countries have similarities in their capital structure. For instance, asset structure 
and profitability have a negative relationship with leverage in both countries. They 
argued that this situation may occur due to the similarities of the civil law in the two 
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countries. On the other hand, they argued that any differences that occur in the capital 
structure determinants are not due to country factors but are firm specific.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3.1 Data and methodology 
The objective of this thesis is three-fold. First, this study explores the impact of 
various corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. In the second part of 
this project, the relationship between the capital structure and corporate governance is 
examined. The last part refers to the capital structure determinants.  
 
3.2 Sample 
The empirical investigation of this thesis is focused on firms listed on the Athens 
Stock Exchange. The sample is consisted of 215 non-financial firms. Financial firms 
such as banks, insurance companies, investment companies, leasing and utilities firms 
were excluded from the sample because of the differences in the regulatory 
requirements, financial reporting standards and compliance compared to non-financial 
firms. Companies with missing data were excluded from the sample.  The examination 
period spans from 2005 to 2009.  
The data used for this research were extracted from the audited financial reports 
of 215 companies listed on Athens Stock Exchange and resulted in 1,075 observations.  
For the collection of the data the website of Athens Stock Exchange and the Thomson 
One database were utilized.  
 
3.3 Variable Selection 
 Tobin’s Q  
This study utilizes the Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) devised by James Tobin in 1969 as 
performance ratio. Q ratio is computed by dividing the market value of a company by 
the replacement value of the firm’s assets. A common problem between scholars is that 
the replacement cost information is not easy to identify. Alternative calculation of 
Tobin’s Q ratio is given by dividing year-end market capitalization by the book value of 
total assets. Nor et al. (1999) used this modification to compute the Tobin’s Q ratio. 
Moreover, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) chose Tobin’s q ratio as the preferred 
measure of firm performance. It should be referred that Weir et al. (2002) showed that 
the higher the value of Tobin’s Q ratio, the more effective the governance mechanisms, 
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and the better the market’s perception of the company’s performance. In this project 
Tobin’s Q ratio is used as dependent variable so as to measure the performance of the 
firm. 
 
 Return on Equity – Return on Assets  
Return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) are employed as 
profitability ratios to measure firm performance. The computation of ROE and ROA 
ratios is made by taking net profit as a percentage of equity value and net profit as a 
percentage of the total assets, respectively. Daily and Dalton (1998) and Rhoades et al. 
(2000) also used in their research the return on assets ratio as a firm performance ratio.   
On the other hand, Kajola (2008) used the return on equity to proxy firm 
performance. Furthermore, he found that board size, board composition and CEO 
duality are positively correlated with performance. For the second and the third part of 
this study ROA is also used as measure of profitability and is computed with the same 
formula. Titman and Wessels, (1988); Fama and French, (2002) proposed ROA ratio as 
a capital structure determinant. Moreover, Hasan and Butt (2009) showed
 
that 
profitability of firm (ROA) have a negative relationship with leverage levels because of 
the existence of pecking order theory. 
 
 Price-to-earnings ratio 
Another ratio that assesses firm performance is the price-to-earnings ratio (PE) 
which is considered a valuation ratio.
 
Ahmadu et al. (2005) 
 
and also Ehikioya (2009) 
used the PE ratio to measure the performance of corporations. The formula adopted by 
the above researchers is the ratio of price per share to earnings per share which is the 
formula used in this effort. Nevertheless, the natural logarithm of the ratio is computed 
so as to normalize the distribution of the variable. 
 
 Price-to-book value 
Another dependent variable is the price-to-book value ratio (P/BV) which is also 
a measure of performance. Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2005) employed P/BV to study 
firm performance in the Brazilian capital market. Following Garay and Gonzalez (2008) 
as well as in this project, P/BV is computed as the market capitalization over the book 
value of equity. Again natural logarithm is taken to normalize the distribution of the 
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variable. The positive effect of price-to-book value provides a relatively stable, intuitive 
measure of value which can be compared to the market price.  
 
 Leverage  
Two variables are used to measure leverage. The first measure, leverage 
(LEVER) is calculated by dividing total debt by the book value of total equity. The 
scope of this project is to discover if there is any relationship between LEVER and PE 
ratio and between LEVER and price-to-book value ratio. The second measure of 
leverage that is used in this study is the debt ratio (DR) which is defined as the total 
liabilities divided by total assets (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Note that total liabilities 
include accounts payable and leases.  It should be mentioned that debt ratio is used as a 
dependent variable for both the second and the third part of this study. 
 
 Board Size  
A variable that is used in this thesis’ regression models is board size (BD) which 
indicates the total number of board members. Most of the scholars that have examined 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance and the 
relationship between corporate governance and capital structure have used board size as 
independent variable. In specific, Hossain et al. (2001), Roszaini and Mohhamad (2006) 
as well as Ehikioya (2009) used board size as independent variable so as to find if there 
is any relationship between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms. 
Moreover, Abor (2007)
 
in his study for the Malaysian listed firms used board size to 
find if there is any relationship between the board size and capital structure. In this 
project board size is computed as the natural logarithm of the total number of directors 
on the board. 
 
 Board Composition  
This study employs board composition (OUT_DIR) as the proportion of outside 
directors to the total number of directors on the board. As outside directors are 
perceived those who are not an active or retired employee of the firm, those who do not 
have close business ties (e.g. consultant, supplier, etc) with the firm and those who do 
not have shareholdings in the firm. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and 
Black (2002) used board composition variable so as to examine whether there is a 
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relationship with firm performance. Additionally, Wen et al. (2002) and Abor (2007) 
used board composition variable to examine whether there is a relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure. 
 
 CEO Duality  
CEO duality (CEO_DUAL) is measured as a dummy variable. The variable 
takes zero in case of CEO duality and one otherwise. Roszaini and Mohammad (2006) 
and also Kajola (2008) have also used CEO duality to examine the correlation between 
corporate governance and firm performance. On the other hand, Abor (2007) used this 
variable to examine relation of corporate governance and capital structure for the 
Ghanaian listed firms. 
 
 Audit Company 
The variable audit company (AUD) is employed to test whether affects firm 
performance. The independent variable audit company takes one for the non-big five 
audit companies and zero otherwise. As big five audit companies have been employed 
the four biggest audit firms all over the world such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Ernst & Young and Deloitte. It is also employed one of the greater audit companies in 
Greece which is SOL. According to Percy (1997) 
 
auditors are expected to be free of 
commercial influence, objective and competent. Additionally, she argues that dynamic 
auditing will maintain societal confidence and good cooperation between management 
and auditors. The public seems to believe auditors have a responsibility for the integrity 
of the businesses and therefore, it is expected big-five audit firms to add firm value. 
 
 Tangibility 
A firm with a large amount of tangible assets (TANG) has the ability to provide 
them as collateral to the lenders and achieve lower interest rates. Scott (1977) argued 
that firms prefer to issue as much secured debt as possible because of the lower agency 
costs. Consequently, it is expected that firms with large tangible assets may have 
positive relationship with debt. On the other hand, companies with stable earnings are 
able to generate funds internally and avoid the use of external financing. Thus, a 
negative relationship between tangibility and leverage may occur due to internal use of 
funds. Rajan and Zingales, (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988), Frank and Goyal (2003) 
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measured tangibility as the ratio of the tangible assets divided by the total assets of the 
firm, as it is measured in this project. 
 
 Growth 
Moreover, this project aims to investigate whether growth (GR) affects firm’s 
capital structure. On the one hand, it has been objected that growth may cause variations 
to the firm value. These variations can cause an increase in the risk. Thus, companies 
with growth trends may face difficulties in the external financing (Daskalakis and 
Psillaki, 2008). Similarly, Myers (1977) argued that firms with growth prospective tend 
to have lower leverage. On the other hand, firms with growth opportunities usually 
require additional capital (Michaelas et al., 1999). Therefore, the results may show 
either positive or negative relationship. Growth is measured as the annual percentage 
change in sales. Moreover, another proxy for growth that is also used is the capital 
expenditure (CAPEX). CAPEX is defined as the natural logarithm of capital 
expenditures over total assets. Roszaini and Mohammad (2006) used CAPEX in order 
to examine the relationship between corporate governance and capital structure. 
 
 Size 
Other explanatory variables used in this thesis are sales revenue (SA) and total 
assets (FS). Both are used as proxies for size. More specifically, the first variable (SA) 
is calculated as the natural logarithm of sales at the end of the financial year. 
Particularly, a correlation between Tobin’s Q ratio and sales revenue is investigated. 
Natural logarithm of sales is used to proxy size (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). Alternatively, firm size can be measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets (FS). Firms size is expected to be positively related with leverage because 
large firms usually enjoy lower transaction costs related with debt. Moreover, 
transaction costs can be diversified and this allows firms to enjoy lower interest rates in 
external funds because of lower risk and bankruptcy costs (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 
2008).        
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 Age of firm 
Another control variable that is tested whether affects the capital structure of the 
Greek listed firms is the age of the firm at time t from its day of incorporation. The 
variable is denoted as AGF and it has been used in order to examine if there is any 
relationship between age of firms and leverage (Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et 
al., 1999, Hall et al., 2004)  
 
 Non-Debt Tax Shields 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extend Miller’s (1977) study over non-debt tax 
shields (NDTS). They found that apart from interest expenses, depreciation and 
investment tax credits can provide non-debt tax shields. They also argued that a firm 
with larger non-debt tax shields is expected to use a smaller amount of debt. Wald 
(1999) in his empirical work used the ratio of depreciation to total assets and found 
negative correlation between leverage and non-debt tax shields. For the calculation of 
non-debt tax shield is used annual depreciation charges divided by total assets.    
 
3.4 Model specification 
This study employs the panel data methodology. A panel data combines features 
of both time series and cross-section data. The panel regression equation differs from a 
regular time-series or cross section regression. Panel data gives “more informative data, 
more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency.” Moreover, panel data can better detect and measure effects that simply 
cannot be observed in pure cross-section or pure time series data. It motivates the study 
of more complicated behavioral models. In short, panel data can enrich empirical 
analysis in ways that may not be possible in cross-section or time series data analysis 
(Baltagi, 2005). 
 The model used is considered to be a balanced panel data model because each 
cross-sectional unit has the same number of time series observations.
 
Finally, because of 
having a balanced panel model the possibility of having endogeneity is decreasing 
rapidly.  
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The general form of the panel data model can be specified as: 
 
0 1 2 .....it it it n it itX X X               1,.......,i N  1,.......,t T  
 
Where i denotes the firm (cross section dimension) and t denotes time (time series 
dimension). Therefore, 
itY is the dependent variable of pooling N cross sectional 
observations and T time series observations, and itX  are the independent variables 
pooling N cross sectional observations and T time series observations.  is the change 
coefficient for itX . 0  is the constant term or intercept. Finally, most of the panel data 
applications utilize a one-way error component model for the disturbances, with
it i it     where i denotes the unobservable individual-specific effect and it  
denotes the remainder disturbance.
 
The method of analysis that is employed in this project is the multivariate 
regression and the method of estimation is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). According to 
Brooks (2008) OLS estimator is considered the most appropriate (i.e. it has the lowest 
variance among the class of linear unbiased estimators). So it is optimal in the sense that 
no other linear, unbiased estimator might have a smaller sampling variance. It would be 
evitable to find an estimator with a lower sampling variance than the OLS estimator, but 
it would either be non-linear or biased or both. Moreover, it should be pointed out that 
OLS estimators are not as sensitive to specification errors compared to other 
approaches.  
At this point, it is considered integral to refer to the different panel estimator 
approaches. There are broadly two classes of panel estimator approaches that can be 
employed in financial research, fixed effects models and random effects models. 
Moreover, there are two subtypes of fixed effects models, the entity fixed effects model 
and the time fixed effects model. Specifically, the entity fixed effects model allow the 
intercept of the model to vary between the cross section units, but not over time. For the 
time fixed effect model the dummy variables capture the time variation. An alternative 
to the fixed effects model is the random model, which is also known as the error 
components model. Random effects approach proposes different intercept terms for 
each entity and these intercepts are constant over time, with the relationships between 
the independent and dependent variables assumed to be the same both cross-sectionally 
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and temporally (Brooks, 2008). All regression models are tested for fixed and random 
effects by using the Hausman and Likelihood tests, respectively.   
Next, five regression models are illustrated. 
 
Model 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6_ _it it it it it it it itTQ BD OUT DIR CEO DUAL CAPEX SA AUD              
 
Model 2 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6_ _it it it it it it it itPE BD OUT DIR CEO DUAL FS AUD LEVER              
 
Model 3 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6_ _it it it it it it it itPBV BD OUT DIR CEO DUAL FS LEVER AUD              
 
where, 
itTQ = Tobin’s Q ratio of firm i  at time t  
itROE = Return on Equity of firm i  at time t  
itPE  = Price to Earnings ratio of firm i  at time t  
itPBV = Price-to-book Value Ratio of firm i  at time t  
0 = The intercept of the equation 
 = The change co-efficient for it
X
variables 
i = The number of the firm i.e. 1,.......,i N   
t =The time period i.e. 1,.......,t T  
itBD = Board Size of firm i  at time t  
_ itOUT DIR = Board Composition of firm i  at time t  
_ itCEO DUAL = CEO Duality of firm i  at time t  
itCAPEX = Capital Expenditures of firm i  at time t  
itSA = Net sales of firm i  at time t  
itAUD =Audit Company of firm i  at time t  
itFS = Firm Size of firm i  at time t  
itLEVER = Leverage of firm i  at time t  
it  = Error term 
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The above models are used to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance of the Greek listed firms. The dependent 
variables used in these four models are proxies for firm performance and are Tobin’s Q, 
price to earnings ratio (PE) and price-to-book value (P/BV).  The independent variables 
include measures of board composition and structure and other control variables. 
Specifically, for the board composition variable are used the variables of board size and 
outside directors, for corporate governance mechanisms are used CEO duality and audit 
company and finally other control variables include leverage, firm size and capital 
expenditure. 
 
Model 4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6_ _it it it it it it it itDR BD OUT DIR CEO DUAL FS ROA AGF                
 
where, 
itDR = Debt ratio of firm i  at time t  
0 = The intercept of the equation 
 = The change co-efficient for it
X
variables 
i = The number of the firm i.e. 1,.......,i N   
t =The time period i.e. 1,.......,t T  
itBD = Board Size of firm i  at time t  
_ itOUT DIR = Board Composition of firm i  at time t  
_ itCEO DUAL = CEO Duality of firm i  at time t  
itFS = Firm Size of firm i  at time t  
itROA = Return on Assets of firm i  at time t  
itAGF = Age of Firm of firm i  at time t  
it  = Error term 
 
The second objective of this thesis is to examine the relationship between capital 
structure and corporate governance mechanisms of the Greek listed firms. As control 
variables are used board composition, outside directors, CEO duality, firm size, return 
on assets and the age of the firm. The debt ratio is used as a dependent variable.  
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Model 5 
0 1 2 3 4it it it it it itDR TANG ROA GR FS            
where, 
itDR = Debt ratio of firm i  at time t  
0 = The intercept of the equation 
 = The change co-efficient for itX variables 
i = The number of the firm i.e. 1,.......,i N   
t =The time period i.e. 1,.......,t T  
itTANG = Tangibility of firm i  at time t  
itROA = Return on Assets of firm i  at time t  
itGR = Growth of firm i  at time t  
itFS = Firm Size of firm i  at time t  
it  = Error term 
 
Finally, model five is used in order to find out which are the capital structure 
determinants of the Greek listed firms. The debt ratio is used as a dependent variable 
and tangibility, ROA, firm size and growth as control variables.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4.1 Empirical Results 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table A presents descriptive statistics for the corporate governance, firm 
performance and capital structure variables of the Greek listed firms, respectively.  The 
upper part of the table gives the mean and median of the variables for the period from 
2005 to 2009. The lower part gives the standard deviation for all the variables and for 
the same time period. The behavior of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) is almost the same. The mean of ROE declined from 7.2% to -26.1% during the 
period 2005-2009. This dramatic decline of the profitability value of Greek listed firms 
can be attributed to the consequences of the global financial crisis burst in 2008. 
Moreover, it should be mentioned that Greek firms have also undergone major financial 
problems since 2007. Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ), which is also a performance ratio, 
experienced an increase in its value from 2005 to 2007. The ratio showed a notable 
decline taking a value of 0.379 in 2008 and then remained stable the next year.  
Descriptive statistics also reveal that the average number of board members of 
the Greek listed companies is between seven and eight people. This result is consistent 
with the suggestion of Lipton and Lorcsh (1992) who argued that the preferred board 
size is 8 or 9 with 10 being the limit in order for a board to be effective. Looking at the 
board composition, on average, the proportion of outside directors to the total amount of 
directors remains close to 54.24% for the period of five years. It should be noted that 
both board structure (BD) and outside directors (OUT_DIR) remain stable during the 
period 2005 – 2009. CEO duality (CEO_DUAL) is defined as the dummy variable that 
takes zero when CEO of the company is also chairman of the board and one otherwise. 
The mean of CEO duality is 58.51%. This entails that 125 out of 215 Greek firms 
occupy different persons for the CEO and chairman positions. Concerning audit 
companies (AUD) it is evident that there is a small increase in the number of companies 
that appoint audit companies which belong to the big five group in 2006. The variable 
(AUD) remains stable during the period from 2006 to 2009. 
Furthermore, Table A shows the descriptive statistics for firm size (FS) and net 
sales (SA), which are both proxies for size. It is observed that there is an upward trend 
for the mean of firm size (FS) from 2005 to 2008. In contrast in 2009 firm size (FS) and 
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net sales (SA) decreased to 5.38% and 18.5%, respectively. This decline may be due to 
the financial crisis of 2008. Debt ratio which is defined as total debt to total assets 
shows a stability during the examined period. The mean of debt ratio varies between 
56% and 62%. The percentage of tangible assets, which are usually used as collateral 
for borrowing new debt, remains constant around 52%. The descriptive statistics for net 
sales and firm size indicate that the size of the Greek listed firms remains stable for the 
period under examination. On the other hand, growth shows significant variability from 
2005 to 2007. In 2005 the mean growth was 1.98% and increased up to 20% in 2007. 
However, in 2008 the mean growth rate decreased to 11.58% and the next year to - 
13.44%. This considerable decline is an evidence of the impact that the global financial 
crisis of 2008 had on the Greek economy. Finally, the mean growth was equal to 6.63% 
for the whole period that is examined. 
Table B presents the correlation matrix for the dependent and independent 
variables. Diagonal elements (correlations of variables with themselves) are always 
equal to one. As it can be seen from correlation matrix the highest correlation is 
between return on equity (ROE) and leverage (LEVER) (0.966). This may occur 
because the two variables have the same denominator which is the total shareholder 
equity. Furthermore, it is observed a high correlation between firm size (FS) and net 
sales (SA) (0.857). It can be argued that due to the fact that both variables are proxies 
for size are highly correlated. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity, the highly 
correlated variables are not included simultaneously in the regression analysis. Except 
for the above correlated variables, all the rest pair wise combinations are less than 0.40.  
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4.1.2 Regression analysis  
Table 1: Regression Outputs 
Variable  
  
Model 1  
(TQ) 
Model 2 
(PE) 
Model 3 
(PBV) 
Model 4 
(DR) 
Model 5 
(DR) 
Intercept 
 
0.2573 -0.3446 0.3827*** 0.6368*** 0.6087*** 
 
(0.0998) (-0.6079) (2.4506) (9.9028) (21.4195) 
Board Size  
(BD)  
2.7638* 0.0557 0.1959** -0.0634** 
 
 
(1.9445) (0.1753) (2.2362) (-2.1687) 
 
Outside Directors 
(OUT_DIR)   
1.9471 0.9106** 0.1295 0.0660* 
 
 
(1.0337) (2.2250) (1.1338) (1.7417) 
 
CEO Duality  
(CEO_DUAL)  
-1.4336* -0.3068* -0.0730 -0.039*** 
 
 
(-1.9282) (-1.8632) (-1.6075) (-2.5865) 
 
Audit Company 
(AUD)  
-0.9649 0.0726 -0.0256 
  
 
(-1.3530) (0.4616) (-0.5892) 
  
Net Sales 
(SA)  
-1.0286*** 
    
 
(-4.4597) 
    
Return on Assets 
(ROA)  
   
-1.2154*** -1.2101*** 
 
   
(-20.3843) (-20.8507) 
Firm Size 
(FS)  
 
0.2243*** -0.0301* 0.0321*** 0.0237*** 
 
 
(3.5975) (-1.8049) (5.6136) (4.7943) 
Tangibility 
(TANG)  
    
-0.2279*** 
 
    
(-7.2788) 
Age of Firm  
(AGF)  
   
-0.0227* 
 
 
   
(-1.7386) 
 
Leverage  
(LEVER)  
 
-0.0054 0.0112*** 
  
 
 
(-1.2195) (8.7857) 
  
Capital 
Expenditures 
(CAPEX) 
 
-0.0723 
    
 
(-0.1551) 
    
Growth 
(GR)  
    
-0.0057 
 
    
(-0.3533) 
       F-statistic 
 
3.0226 4.6783 9.5717 44.4561 61.4504 
R-squared (%) 
 
0.0276 0.0276 0.0825 29.47 31.65 
Adjusted R-
squared (%)   
0.0184 0.2172 0.0739 28.80 31.13 
Note: *, ** , *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
t-statistics are shown in the form ( ).   
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Table 1 displays the regression results of model one. Board size (BD), CEO 
duality (CEO_DUAL) and net sales (SA) have significant impact on Tobin’s Q. In 
specific, board size has a positive and statistically significant relationship with Tobin’s 
Q ratio. This means that as the number of directors increase the performance of the firm 
improves. In contrast, the variable CEO duality has a statistically negative correlation 
with firm performance. This means that firms which have separate persons occupying 
the posts of chief executive and chairman of the board can have a negative influence on 
the performance of the firm.  
Additionally, the proxy of firm size (SA) is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. It should be mentioned that net sales has a negative relationship with firm 
performance. This implies that as the size of the firm increase firm performance 
worsens. This result supports the so-called “size effect hypothesis”.  On the other hand, 
the variables of outside directors (OUT_DIR), capital expenditure (CAPEX) and audit 
company (AUD) are statistically insignificant and there is no correlation with Tobin’s Q 
ratio (TQ).   
Furthermore, table 1 show the regression results of model two. First, the 2.1% of 
the variability of P/E ratio (PE) is explained by the regression model. Moreover board 
composition (OUT_DIR), CEO duality (CEO_DUALITY) and firm size (FS) are 
statistically significant at 5%, 10% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 Specifically, board composition has a positive relationship with firm 
performance (PE). This means that the greater the proportion of outside directors the 
better the firm performance. In contrast, CEO duality has a negative relationship with 
firm performance. Consequently, the performance of the Greek listed firms weakens 
when the CEO and chairman of the firm are occupied by different persons. This result is 
in contrast with that found by Roszaini and Mohammad (2006) as well as Sulong and 
Nor (2010) who did not find that separating the roles of the CEO and chairman 
positions play any significant role in the performance of Malaysian listed firms. Another 
variable that positively influences firm performance is firm size (FS).  This implies that 
the bigger the firm the better its performance.  Thus, for every unit increase in firm size, 
PE ratio goes up by 0.22 units. On the other hand, board size, audit company and 
leverage do not exert any significant effect on firm performance.  
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Table 1 shows the regression outputs of model three. In this model it is assessed 
the impact of various control variables to the price-to-book value ratio (PBV) which is 
an alternative firm performance measure. The results show that 7.3%, of the variability 
of price-to-book value ratio (PBV) is explained by the regression. It can be indicated 
that board size (BS) is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. Moreover, firm 
size is also statistically significant at 10% level.  
On the other hand, board composition, audit company and CEO duality are 
statistically insignificant. It should be mentioned that although the independent variable 
CEO duality does not influence significantly the performance of the firm it has negative 
sign. Additionally, Abdullah (2004) did not find any significant relationship between 
CEO duality and performance in Malaysian listed companies. The above result confirms 
the statement of Myring (2006) who argued that Greece presents many significant 
differences from other developed markets since it is classified within the emerging 
Asian and Near East accounting regime (such as India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and 
Turkey). 
On the second part of this project it is examined the relationship between various 
corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure. Model four represents the 
regression model that is used to examine the above relationship. The results from the 
regression model four (Table 1) indicate that debt ratio is negatively affected by board 
size (BS) at 5% level of significance. Berger et al. (1997) and Abor (2007) found 
similar results (i.e. larger boards prefer low debt levels).  
Moreover, board composition (OUT_DIR) is positive and statistically significant 
at 10% level.  These findings suggest that firms which employ more non-executive 
directors on the boards tend to pursue high debt policy. This result is in line with Abor 
(2007) who found the similar results for the Ghanaian firms.  In contrast, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) showed that there is no correlation 
between board composition and performance 
Also, there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between CEO 
duality and leverage (DR). This suggests that Greek listed firms which separate the 
roles of CEO and chairman tend to employ lower proportion of debt.  Firm size (FS) has 
a statistically significant and positive relationship with capital structure (DR). This 
suggests that the larger the firm, the more debt it employs in its capital structure.  
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Another variable that negatively influences debt ratio is ROA. Its coefficient 
shows that for every unit that ROA rises, debt ratio decreases by 1.21 units. This 
implies that as the profitability of the Greek listed firms increase, the debt that firms 
issue decreases. Consequently, Greek firms prefer to use internal funding (retained 
earnings) for their new investments. The above result is in line with the pecking order 
theory. 
The last variable that can affect the leverage of a company is the number of 
years that a firm operates (AGF). The results show (Table 1) that the age of the firm has 
a negative relationship with leverage. It could be implied that long-operating firms have 
already found a stable source of income that can produce funds internally. However, 
this result regarding the impact of the age of the firms is in contrast with Roszaini and 
Mohammad (2006) and also Sulong and  Nor (2010) research papers, who found that 
the age of the listed Malaysia firms have positive effect on firm value. Their result can 
be interpreted that older firms tend to have more reputation and therefore better access 
to the capital market.  
On the last regression model five is examined the capital structure determinants 
of the Greek listed firms. First, tangibility (TANG) is statistically significant at 1% level 
and affects negatively the leverage of the firms. This result was consistent with that of 
Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008). It should be mentioned that companies with large 
tangible assets usually show positive relationship with debt ratio. On the other hand, the 
negative relationship between tangibility and debt indicates that Greek listed firms have 
the ability to generate the essential funds internally for financing their future 
investments. This result is consistent with the pecking order theory which claims that 
firms prefer internal financing rather than external.  
Firm size (FS) is found to positively affect the capital structure of the firm. 
Specifically, when firm size increases by one unit debt ratio increases by 0.023 units.  
This result implies that when Greek firms increase their size they also increase their 
debt exposure. As a firm increases its size it may enjoy lower interest rates than smaller 
firms. Additionally, return on assets (ROA) displays a negative relationship with debt 
ratio (DR) as in model four. This means that when Greek firms increase their 
profitability they decrease their leverage levels. The results are consistent with Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) study. Furthermore, the above results are consistent with the 
pecking order theory. On the other hand, growth (GR) has no relationship with the 
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capital structure. This implies that the growth of the Greek listed firms does not affect 
their capital structure and this result is in line with Daskalakis and Psillaki (2008) 
results.   
 
4.2 Sensitivity tests 
As a robustness test we used various performance ratios (dependent variables) in 
order to examine whether there are related with corporate governance practices. The 
results were almost identical. Furthermore, for testing the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure, apart from debt ratio and 
leverage it is also employed gearing ratio as dependent variable. The results did not alter 
significantly. Finally to detect the capital structure determinants of the Greek listed 
firms, a regression model by using leverage instead of debt ratio as dependent variable 
was used. Again the results were similar. It should be referred that for the last model the 
independent variable non-debt tax shields was tested so as to examine if there is any 
impact on the capital structure. The results did not indicate any significant relationship.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5.1 Conclusions and Recommendations 
There is no doubt that several studies have been conducted so far examining the 
relation between firm performance and corporate governance and the relation between 
capital structure and corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, there is abundant 
literature on the capital structure determinants. However, the results of previous studies 
are mixed. This study tries to examine all the above relations using data from Greece. 
Since 2001 there has been a growing interest in the corporate governance practices in 
the light of US corporate collapses. In the wake of companies collapse, governments 
have designed policies of resolving problems related with the protection of interests of 
shareholders and creditors. In response to high demand for protective measures, the 
Hellenic Capital Market Committee introduced the law 3016/2002 as the first corporate 
governance code that all Greek listed firms should adopt since 2002  
A critical aspect of the current study is how corporate governance affects the 
capital structure of a company. Decisions related to capital structure are crucial for any 
business organization.
 
Good corporate governance practices may have significant 
influence on the strategic decisions of a company such as the optimal allocation of debt.  
Capital structure determinants were also investigated. Since the seminal work of 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) who put forward the irrelevance theory of capital structure 
a number of studies attempted to find the best combination of debt and equity that 
maximizes firm value. The study employed a sample of 215 Greek firms listed on the 
Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2005 to 2009 using the panel data methodology.  
To examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance there were used three different performance ratios, that is, the Tobin’s Q 
ratio, the price-to-earnings ratio and the price-to-book value ratio. To measure the effect 
of corporate governance a number of variables were used such board size, board 
composition, CEO duality, firm size, leverage, audit company and capital expenditures. 
Furthermore, to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
capital structure the debt ratio was employed as a dependent variable, while board size, 
board composition, CEO duality, firm size, profitability and age of the firm were the 
corporate governance variables. Finally, tangibility, profitability, firm size and growth 
were used as capital structure determinants. 
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Concerning the first relation the results showed that firm performance was 
affected by the number of the directors in the board, CEO duality and firm size. In 
contrast, the proportion of outside directors to the total number of directors did not 
affect performance ratio (Tobin’s Q ratio). Furthermore, the study revealed that PE ratio 
is correlated with board composition and firm size in the positive way. Additionally, 
CEO duality has a negative influence on firm performance. The above result indicated 
that Greek firms should employ the same person for the positions of CEO and chairman 
of the board so as to ensure optimal performance. Finally, the last performance ratio 
used is the price-to-book value ratio. The regression result suggested that firms with 
many directors in the board have a higher performance. Moreover, firm size and 
leverage affect the performance of Greek listed firms. Firm size affects negatively the 
performance in contrast to the leverage which affects it positively. Finally, audit 
company variable is not found to be correlated with firm performance although it was 
examined in three different regression models. Therefore, Greek firms are not affected 
by the audit company they employ.  
This study also examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
capital structure decisions of listed firms in the ASE. The corporate governance 
variables analyzed were board size, board composition, CEO duality, profitability, firm 
size and age of the firm. The empirical results showed statistically significant and 
positive associations between capital structure and board composition and firm size. On 
the other hand, there is a negatively statistically significant relationship between capital 
structure and board size, CEO duality, profitability and age of the firm.  
The last model of this study examines the capital structure determinants of the 
Greek listed firms. Tangibility, profitability, firm size and sales growth are the 
determinants of the capital structure that were examined. The results showed that 
tangibility affects negatively the debt level of the firms. The negative relationship of 
tangibility with leverage implies that Greek listed firms have the ability to generate their 
funds internally. This result is in line with the pecking order theory. Similarly, the 
results showed a negative relationship between firm profitability and debt ratio. This 
indicates that an increase in profitability causes a decrease in leverage of the Greek 
listed firms. On the other hand, firm size is positively correlated with the capital 
structure of the firm. This means that Greek listed firms tend to borrow more funds as 
total assets increase. The last variable tested is growth. The results show an insignificant 
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negative relationship between growth and leverage. Consequently, growth is not a 
capital structure determinant for the Greek listed firms 
Future research should be directed to different models and estimators that can 
test the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance or capital 
structure. Moreover, future studies could investigate other aspects of corporate 
governance variables, such as executive compensation, audit fees, nominating 
committees, etc. It is hoped that this paper will provoke further research in these fields 
because as it was already mentioned above, this thesis tries to analyze the theme as good 
as it gets using the present bibliography.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Descriptive Statistics  
 
  
  
2005 2006 
 Mean 
 
Median  Max  Min 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean 
 
Median  Max  Min 
 Std. 
Dev. 
AGF 3.242 3.332 4.836 1.38 0.607 3.288 3.367 4.844 1.609 0.580 
AUD 0.388 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.488 0.444 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.498 
CAPEX 0.163 0.028 24.28 0.000 1.659 0.061 0.030 2.340 0.000 0.179 
CEO_DUAL 0.593 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.492 0.598 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.491 
DR 0.562 0.578 2.295 0.046 0.225 0.561 0.586 1.084 0.009 0.193 
FS 4.623 4.505 9.287 1.659 1.378 4.703 4.572 9.427 1.559 1.378 
GR 0.020 0.038 1.399 -0.563 0.226 0.130 0.120 1.192 -0.981 0.261 
LEVER 1.249 1.423 25.020 -121.88 8.878 2.201 1.461 55.73 -26.20 5.538 
PBV 0.578 0.392 2.956 -2.768 0.669 0.653 0.521 3.550 -2.168 0.670 
PE 1.595 2.488 4.501 -4.398 2.330 1.412 2.541 4.595 -4.59 2.606 
BD 1.978 1.946 2.708 1.099 0.294 1.995 1.946 2.708 1.386 0.288 
SA 4.137 3.997 8.803 -0.895 1.566 4.215 4.120 9.002 -2.158 1.665 
NDTS 0.031 0.025 0.263 0.000 0.031 0.030 0.025 0.304 0.000 0.033 
OUT_DIR 0.536 0.500 2.143 0.222 0.196 0.542 0.500 2.143 0.222 0.197 
ROA 0.020 0.018 0.477 -0.49 0.072 0.025 0.021 0.699 -0.536 0.089 
ROE 0.072 0.044 7.438 -2.03 0.579 0.022 0.058 2.115 -3.646 0.469 
TANG 0.535 0.556 0.985 0.018 0.211 0.523 0.546 0.996 0.020 0.217 
TQ 0.657 0.444 9.666 0.055 0.845 0.778 0.570 9.750 0.049 0.874 
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics (Cont.)  
 
  
  
2007 2008 
 Mean  Median  Max  Min 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Median  Max  Min 
 Std. 
Dev. 
AGF 3.331 3.401 4.852 1.792 0.556 3.371 3.434 4.860 1.946 0.534 
AUD 0.425 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.496 0.439 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.497 
CAPEX 0.053 0.030 0.813 0.000 0.089 0.056 0.031 0.860 0.000 0.092 
CEO_DUAL 0.579 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.495 0.598 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.491 
DR 0.583 0.592 1.466 0.017 0.198 0.607 0.599 1.978 0.024 0.230 
FS 4.813 4.743 9.345 1.746 1.395 4.870 4.751 9.318 1.767 1.404 
GR 0.201 0.119 9.682 -1.000 0.712 0.116 0.050 4.148 -0.989 0.439 
LEVER 1.937 1.512 59.44 -29.09 4.922 1.974 1.548 12.449 -11.46 2.376 
PBV 0.675 0.489 3.640 -2.208 0.663 0.730 0.670 2.783 -1.248 0.601 
PE 1.477 2.583 4.576 -4.587 2.518 0.831 1.672 4.532 -4.541 2.189 
BD 2.002 1.946 2.833 1.386 0.294 1.993 1.946 2.708 1.609 0.293 
SA 4.339 4.323 9.052 -3.243 1.657 4.384 4.302 9.223 -1.654 1.675 
NDTS 0.032 0.023 0.401 0.000 0.045 0.031 0.022 0.277 0.000 0.037 
OUT_DIR 0.535 0.500 2.143 0.167 0.198 0.543 0.500 2.143 0.333 0.196 
ROA 0.028 0.023 1.149 -0.489 0.111 -0.004 0.011 0.534 -1.740 0.159 
ROE 0.084 0.066 5.218 -2.605 0.500 0.038 0.037 2.201 -2.815 0.396 
TANG 0.509 0.534 0.996 0.001 0.219 0.507 0.523 0.950 0.000 0.227 
TQ 0.832 0.579 7.573 0.096 0.903 0.381 0.221 4.782 0.026 0.490 
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics (Cont.)  
 
  
  
2009 2005 – 2009 
 Mean  Median  Max  Min 
 Std. 
Dev.  Mean  Median  Max  Min 
 Std. 
Dev. 
AGF 3.410 3.466 4.868 2.079 0.515 3.328 3.367 4.868 1.386 0.560 
AUD 0.453 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.499 0.428 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.495 
CAPEX 0.042 0.018 0.693 0.000 0.081 0.075 0.028 24.28 0.000 0.748 
CEO_DUAL 0.570 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.496 0.585 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.493 
DR 0.627 0.595 5.815 0.007 0.444 0.588 0.591 5.815 0.007 0.275 
FS 4.816 4.628 9.214 1.363 1.440 4.745 4.627 9.427 -2.10 1.440 
GR -0.13 -0.129 1.993 -0.998 0.270 0.066 0.046 9.682 -1.000 0.437 
LEVER 4.704 1.520 517.96 -5.618 35.44 2.411 1.511 517.96 -121.9 16.679 
PBV 0.659 0.623 4.597 -2.209 0.663 0.674 0.555 6.587 -2.768 0.720 
PE 0.579 1.089 4.572 -4.416 2.419 1.176 2.284 4.595 -4.60 2.442 
BD 2.003 1.946 2.708 1.609 0.276 1.994 1.946 2.833 1.099 0.288 
SA 4.172 4.151 8.851 -2.792 1.802 4.242 4.184 9.223 -3.24 1.687 
NDTS 0.031 0.024 0.303 0.000 0.032 0.031 0.024 0.401 0.000 0.036 
OUT_DIR 0.556 0.551 2.143 0.333 0.186 0.542 0.500 2.143 0.167 0.194 
ROA -0.02 0.001 0.463 -1.95 0.156 0.010 0.013 1.149 -1.95 0.124 
ROE -0.26 0.007 0.960 -45.01 3.095 -0.00 0.041 7.438 -45.01 1.451 
TANG 0.507 0.529 0.951 0.000 0.237 0.518 0.540 0.996 0.000 0.223 
TQ 0.379 0.252 3.819 0.025 0.445 1.204 0.406 243.142 0.025 11.484 
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Table B: Correlation Matrix 
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Table C: Table of Companies (Sample) 
 
1 AEGEK S.A 46 EL. D. MOUZAKIS S.A. 
2 AKRITAS S.A. 47 ELASTRON S.A. 
3 ALCO HELLAS SA  48 ELBISCO HOLDING S.A. 
4 ALFA-BETA VASSILOPOULOS S.A. 49 ELECTRONIKI ATHINON S.A. 
5 ALPHA GRISSIN S.A.  50 ELEFTHERI TILEORASI S.A. 
6 ALSINCO S.A 51 ELFICO S.A.  
7 ALTEC S.A. INFORM. & COMMUN. SYST. 52 ELGEKA S.A. 
8 ALUMIL ALUMINIUM INDUSTRY S.A. 53 ELINOIL S.A 
9 ANEK LINES S.A. 54 ELLAKTOR S.A. 
10 AS COMPANY S.A. 55 ELMEC SPORT S.A. 
11 ASTIR PALACE VOULIAGMENI S.A. 56 ELTON S.A. 
12 ATERMON COMMUNICATION S.A 57 ELTRAK S.A. 
13 ATHENS MEDICAL C.S.A. 58 ELVAL S.A. 
14 ATHENS WATER SUPPLY & SEWAGE Co. 59 ELVE S.A 
15 ATLANTIC SUPER MARKET S.A. 60 ELVIEMEK S.A. 
16 ATTICA HOLDINGS S.A. 61 EMPORIKOS DESMOS S.A. 
17 ATTICA PUBLICATIONS S.A. 62 EUROCONSULTANTS SA 
18 ATTI-KAT S.A 63 EURODRIP S.A 
19 AUTOHELLAS S.A. 64 EUROHOLDINGS S.A. 
20 ΑΧΟΝ S.A. HOLDING 65 EUROMEDICA S.A. 
21 BABIS VOVOS S.A. 66 EVROFARMA SA 
22 BIOKARPET S.A. 67 FASHION BOX HELLAS S.A. 
23 BIOTER S.A 68 F.G. EUROPE S.A 
24 BITROS HOLDING S.A. 69 KYRIAKIDIS S.A. 
25 BYTE COMPUTER S.A. 70 FIERATEX S.A. 
26 C. CARDASSILARIS & SONS - CARDICO S.A. 71 FINTEXPORT S.A. 
27 CENTRIC MULTIMEDIA S.A. 72 FLEXOPACK S.A. 
28 CHATZIKRANIOTIS & SONS MILLS S.A. 73 FLOUR MILLS S.A 
29 COCA-COLA Ε.Ε.Ε. S.A. 74 FLOUR MILLS KEPENOS S.A. 
30 CORINTH PIPEWORKS S.A. 75 FOLLI - FOLLIE S.A 
31 CPI COMPUTER INTERNATIONAL 76 FORTHNET S.A. 
32 CRETE PLASTICS S.A. 77 FOURLIS S.A 
33 CROWN HELLAS CAN 78 FRIGOGLASS S.A. 
34 CYCLON HELLAS S.A. 79 GALAXIDI FISH FARMING S.A. 
35 DAIOS PLASTICS SA 80 GEKE S.A. 
36 DIAGNOSTIC CENTER OF ATHENS HYGEIA 81 GEN. COMMERCIAL & IND. 
37 DIAS AQUACULTURE S.A. 82 GR. SARANTIS S.A. 
38 DIONIC ΑΕΒΕ 83 OPAP S.A. 
39 DOMIKI KRITIS S.A. 84 HALKOR S.A (FORMER VECTOR) 
40 DROMEAS S.A.  85 HATZIOANNOU SA 
41 DRUCKFARBEN HELLAS SA 86 HELLENIC FABRICS S.A.  
42 DUROS S.A. 87 HELLENIC CABLES S.A. 
43 E. PAIRIS S.A 88 HELLENIC DUTY FREE SHOPS S.A. 
44 EDRASIS - C. PSALLIDAS S.A. 89 HELLENIC EXCHANGES S.A. 
45 EKTER S.A. 90 HELLENIC FISHFARMING S.A. 
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91 HELLENIC PETROLEUM S.A. 136 LIGHT METALS INDUSTRY 
92 HELLENIC SUGAR INDUSTRY S.A. 137 LOGISMOS SYSTEMS S.A. 
93 HELLENIC TELECOM. ORG. 138 LOULIS MILLS S.A. 
94 HERACLES GENERAL CEMENT COMp. S.A. 139 MM. J. MAILLIS S.A. 
95 HIPPOTOUR S.A. 140 MARAC ELECTRONICS 
96 I. KLOUKINAS - I. LAPPAS S.A.CONSTR. S.A. 141 MARITIME COMPANY OF LESVOS  
97 IASO S.A. 142 MATHIOS REFRACTORY S.A. 
98 IDEAL GROUP S.A. 143 MEDICON HELLAS S.A 
99 IKONA - IHOS S.A. 144 METKA S.A. 
100 IKTINOS HELLAS S.A. 145 MEVACO S.A. 
101 ILYDA SA 146 MICHANIKI S.A. 
102 IMPERIO ARGO GROUP S.A. 147 MICROLAND COMPUTERS S.A. 
103 Info-Quest S.A. 148 MINERVA KNITWEAR S.A. 
104 INFORM P. LYKOS S.A. 149 MINOAN LINES SA 
105 INFORMER S.A. 150 MLS MULTIMEDIA S.A. 
106 INTERFISH SA 151 MOCHLOS S.A. 
107 INTERTECH S.A. INTER. TECHNOLOGIES 152 MOTOR OIL SA 
108 INTERWOOD-XYLEMPORIA A.T.E.N.E. 153 MOTORCYCLES MARINE ENG. S.A. 
109 INTRAKAT S.A. 154 MYTILINEOS HOLDINGS S.A. 
110 INTRACOM S.A. HOLDINGS 155 N. LEVENTERIS 
111 INTRALOT S.A. 156 N. VARVERIS-MODA BAGNO S.A. 
112 IONIAN HOTEL ENT. 157 NAFPAKTOS TEXTILE IND S.A. 
113 JJ. & P. - AVAX S.A. 158 NEORION HOLDINGS S.A. 
114 J.BOUTARIS & SON HOLDING S.A. 159 NEWSPHONE HELLAS S.A. 
115 JUMBO S.A. 160 NEXANS HELLAS S.A. 
116 KARAMOLENGOS BAKERY INDUSTRY S.A. 161 NIREUS S.A. 
117 KARATZIS S.A. 162 NUTRIART S.A. 
118 KARELIA TOBACCO COMPANY INC. S.A. 163 OLYMPIC CATERING S.A. 
119 KATHIMERINI PUBLISHING SA 164 PPAPERPACK - TSOUKARIDIS S.A. 
120 KEKROPS S.A. 165 PC SYSTEMS S.A. 
121 KERAMIA-ALLATINI S.A. 166 PEGASUS PUBLISHING S.A. 
122 KIRIACOULIS SHIPPING S.A. 167 PERSEUS S.A. 
123 KLEEMANN HELLAS S.A. 168 PETROS PETROPOULOS S.A. 
124 KORDELLOS CH. BROS S.A. 169 PETZETAKIS S.A. 
125 KORRES NATURAL PRODUCTS 170 P.G. NIKAS S.A 
126 KRE.KA S.A. 171 PIPE WORKS S.A. 
127 KRETA FARM SA 172 PLAISIO COMPUTERS S.A. 
128 kRI-KRI SA 173 PLIAS CONSUMER GOODS S.A. 
129 KTIMA KOSTAS LAZARIDIS S.A. 174 PROFILE SYSTEMS & SOFTWARE  
130 LAMBRAKIS PRESS 175 PROODEFTIKH TECHNICAL COMP  
131 LAMDA DEVELOPMENT S.A. 176 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY S.A. 
132 LAMPSA HOTEL CO 177 REVOIL S.A. 
133 LANAKAM S.A. 178 RIDENCO S.A. 
134 LAVIPHARM S.A. 179 RILKEN S.A. 
135 LIBERIS PUBLICATIONS S.A. 180 S & B INDUSTRIAL MINERALS S.A. 
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181 SANYO HELLAS HOLDING S.A. 199 TITAN CEMENT COMPANY S.A. 
182 SATO OFFICE AND HOUSEWARE SUPPLIES S.A. 200 UNIBIOS HOLDINGS S.A. 
183 SELECTED TEXTILE IND. ASSOC. S.A. 201 VARANGIS AVEPE S.A. 
184 SELONDA AQUACULTURE S.A. 202 VARDAS SA 
185 SFAKIANAKIS S.A. 203 VARVARESSOS S.A. 
186 SHELMAN WOOD PROD. MANUF. S.A. 204 VELL GROUP S.A. 
187 SIDENOR S.A. (FORMER ERLIKON) 205 VIOHALKO S.A. 
188 SPACE HELLAS SA 206 VIS CONTAINERS MANUF SA  
189 SPIDER METAL N.PETSIOS & SONS S.A. 207 VIVARTIA S.A. 
190 SPRIDER STORES S.A 208 VIVERE S.A. 
191 STELIOS KANAKIS SA 209 VOGIATZOGLOU SYSTEMS S.A. 
192 THE HOUSE OF AGRICULTURE SPIROY S.A. 210 "WOOL IND TRIA ALFA" S.A. 
193 TECHNICAL OLYMPIC S.A. 211 X. BENRUBI S.A. 
194 TECHNICAL PUBLICATIONS S.A. 212 X. K. TEGOPOULOS EDITIONS  
195 TELETIPOS S.A. 213 XAIDEMENOS S.A. 
196 TEXAPRET S.A. 214 YYALCO - CONSTANTINOU  
197 THESSALONIKI PORT AUTHORITY S.A. 215 ZAMPA S.A. 
198 THRACE PLASTICS CO.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
